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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

when he did not meet with approval in the Kremlin. The problem of the
Polish citizens deported to Russia was no longer mentioned.
The subsequent events went according to plan. Moscow made im-
possible demands of the Poles, which the Polish Government in duty
bound refused. The British Government intervened and the Polish
Government gave in. Immediately Moscow expressed its dissatisfaction
and put forward further demands. The path was retraced again and
again until Moscow was satisfied that the will of its victim was crushed,
after which all negotiations ceased.
Mikolajczyk returned from Moscow where, contrary to the wish of his
own Cabinet^ he had carried out a discussion with the representatives of
the £ Lublin Committee/ and the Scvie;c Council of National Liberation.5
The British pressure on the Polish Government was no longer disguised^
torn from its native land it \vas gradually losing more and more of its
independence. The dozen meetings which Eden held with Mikolajczyk
were mentioned in every daily newspaper, the headlines ran : "Allies
pressing for a Soviet pact with Poland/5 fvAllies urging the Polish-Soviet
agreement "... The British Press again employed the term ' compromise '
—Poland musi make a compromise with Russia in order that the abandon-
ment of Poland by Downing Street should be disguised. The Editor of
the Nineteenth Century and After wrote straight to the point:
" Every compromise in the Polish question was a compromise at the
expense ot Poland. Poland owes the repeated loss of her liberties not to
conquest but to compromise. To-day, for the third time in her history,
she is being compromised out of existence. Compromise is5 indeed, the
classical method of bringing Polish national independence to an end—it has
achieved^ and continues to achieve, what was never achieved by force of
arms alone. That is why the Poles to-day are uncompromising. The
concessions they have been and are still being asked to make, would not3 as
is generally supposed^ mean the sacrifice of a part to save the rest> but the
sacrifice of a part to make the loss of the rest the quicker; the surer^ and the
more irretrievable,"
As the result of British pressure to obtain a e compromise/ Mikolajczyk
placed in the quandary of either ... or else . . . elaborated a fresh plan
for a settlement of the Russo-Polish dispute. The Mikolajczyk Memo-
randum dealt with the foreign and internal Polish policy^ placing it in the
control of the Big Three after the Polish Government had been set up
in the freed capital. The Memorandum moreover proposed that this
Government^ based on the main political parties^ should offer the Com-
munists (the Polish Workers' Party5 P.P.R.) equal representation with
the parties which now composed the Polish Government. It also sug-
gested that the diplomatic relations between the Polish Government and
the Soviet Union should be renewed, and an agreement concluded
regarding the administration of the Polish forces, and for the " definite
co-operation of the Red Army and securing its rear in Poland."
Regarding the frontier problem., the author of the Memorandum pointed
out that (a) Poland should not be diminished as a result of the war (Le.,